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Abstract:  
This paper explores associations between disturbances and cooperative responses in a 
selection of irrigation associations from Spain. Transaction costs and collective action 
theories are used to characterize disturbances and responses. Disturbances are characterized 
by looking at the uncertainty they generate, their frequency, the distance of the transacting 
partners they affect, and their impact on asset specific transactions. Responses are assessed 
based on the collective action tasks they involve and classified into coordination and 
cooperation responses. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis confirms two pathways that are 
sufficient for the emergence of cooperation responses. The first path is congruent with 
transaction costs theory, and points to disturbances that are frequent and asset specific; the 
second path supports relational theory, and points to disturbances that emerge progressively 
from within the system. Other patterns include the tendency of the irrigation associations to 
delegate on external entities when the disturbances are external and occur frequently; and 
the adaptation of existing institutions when the disturbances are internal and progressive.  
 
1. Introduction 
Contemporary societies are increasingly exposed to climate change but also other 
threats such as demographic changes or market crises that are the result of socioeconomic 
development and manifest at multiple scales. This situation has generated a new interest in 
understanding the manner in which communities organize in response to different types of 
menaces in different contexts (UN/ISDR 2004). Research in natural resource management 
has been particularly productive in that regard. According to ecology and complex systems 
scholars, different disturbances may require different responses by communities, but there 
may be also commonalities (Berkes et al. 2003, Anderies et al. 2006). Also, a number of 
scholars studying natural resource management have pointed to the collective-action 
problems involved in adapting to changes, as well as the transaction costs of solving those 
problems (Lam 2006, Villamayor-Tomas 2014, Araral 2013b). All this scholarship calls for 
a systematic characterization of disturbances and the collective responses they trigger. 
This paper advances an institutional economics approach to the study of climate change 
adaptation by local communities (Araral 2013b). Specifically, the paper aims to understand 
adaptation to climate change by looking at a broad spectrum of disturbances, including 
climate-related disturbances like droughts and floods as well as other disturbances. The 
research questions that drive the study are: Are there identifiable patterns in the way local 
communities collectively respond to disturbances of different nature, including droughts 
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and floods but also others? Do disturbance characteristics affect the way the communities 
respond? If so, how?  
Empirically, the study relies on a unique dataset of 50 disturbance-collective response 
cases obtained from the study of 5 Spanish irrigation associations (WUAs). Studying 
adaptability in the irrigation context is useful for several reasons. Irrigated agriculture is 
one of the economic activities where the impact of climate change disturbances is most 
evident (Boken et al. 2005). Second, an important part of the institutional economics theory 
in the field of natural resource management is based on the study of local irrigation 
governance (Ostrom et al. 1994). Spain is well recognized for the long tradition and 
autonomy of its irrigation associations (Ostrom 1990), many of which have successfully 
evolved to combat a variety of threats such as droughts, floods, wars, and plagues over 
centuries. In the last 20 years, however, a series of severe droughts and the growth of cities 
and industry in Spain have resulted in a new concern about the ability of the irrigation 
sector to adapt (Lopez Galvez and Naredo 1997).  Understanding how the irrigation 
communities cope with those threats can be particularly illustrative of patterns of adaptation 
to different types of disturbances. 
Theoretically, the study relies on transaction costs and collective action theories 
(Williamson 1985, Ostrom et al. 1994). Transaction costs theory is used to characterize 
disturbances by looking at the uncertainty they generate, their frequency, the distance of the 
transacting partners they affect, and their impact on asset specific transactions. Collective 
action theory is used to feature responses based on the collective action tasks they involve. 
Relationships between different types of disturbances and responses are then explored via 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).  
 
2. Theoretical framework: transactions, coordination and cooperation 
 
Theory on tradable property rights (Coase), institutional design principles (Ostrom), 
and transaction costs (Williamson), also coined as the COW framework, can constitute a 
foundation for the analytics of climate change adaptation (Araral 2013b). A few studies on 
climate adaptation in the irrigation sector have set the path in that direction (Araral 2013a, 
Varela-Ortega et al. 2016, Villamayor-Tomas 2014). This study builds on those efforts. 
Specifically, the study adopts a model according to which the responses of self-organized 
communities to disturbances depends on the extent to which the disturbances motivate 
cooperative responses and the costs of collective action (Fleischman et al. 2010).  
 
2.1 Disturbance features and the motivation for cooperation  
 
Disturbance can be defined as an “event that disrupts social or ecological communities, 
resulting in changes to the physical or social environment” (Fleischman et al. 2010). 
Different authors have theorized about types of disturbances. Salafski et al. (2008), for 
example, distinguish between threats vs. stresses; and Schoon and Cox (2011) classify 
disturbances depending on aspects such as intensity or frequency.   
Transaction cost theory  can be used to reason about the  relationship between 
disturbance features and the motivation for cooperation. Transaction costs scholars are 
interested in the governance conditions that make transactions between economically 
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motivated agents to function efficiently given the risk that agents behave opportunistically 
(Williamson 1985). Hagedorn (2008) developed the concept of nature-related transactions 
(nr-t) to recognize the mediating role of physical conditions in human interactions. 
According to the concept, many interactions between individuals happen only indirectly, as 
they use shared biophysical resources. Thus, it is not only necessary to study the 
characteristics of the transactions resulting from person-to-person interactions, but also 
those that emerge from person-to-nature-to-person interactions. This concept applies 
particularly well to the study of irrigation systems and associations, where interactions 
between farmers are mediated by the use of shared infrastructure and water resources.  
The scholarship applying transaction costs economics to environmental governance has 
identified a number of nr-t features and theorized about their impact on the motivation for 
cooperative governance structures (Thiel et al. 2016).  The paragraphs that follow describe 
these features and explore their applicability to characterize disturbances and their impact 
on the motivation for cooperative responses in the irrigation context. 
In an asset specific transaction, the investments made to accomplish the transaction are 
rather unique to the partners involved. If the transaction fails, partners are likely to incur 
losses “because, for example, alternative transacting partners cannot deliver the same good 
or service or because they do not have access to the same assets” (Thiel et al. 2016), p. 12). 
To minimize the risk of failure, partners may be particularly willing to engage in long-term 
cooperation under a common organization as opposed to ad hoc contracting (Williamson 
1991). Irrigation associations are a good example of the relevance of asset specificity. 
Farmers in irrigation systems engage in three fundamental nature related-transactions: 
water use, water allocation and infrastructure maintenance (Tang 1992). Water use is a nr-t 
because the amount of water withdrawn by a farmer in an irrigation system affects the 
amount of water that other farmers in the system can use. Water allocation is also a nr-t 
because farmers in an irrigation system usually cannot withdraw the water all at once, i.e., 
some farmers will not be able to use water if other farmers are doing it already. 
Infrastructure maintenance is also a nr-t because the infrastructure is shared, so if a farmer 
does not maintain it, that will affect not only him but also other farmers. All three nature-
related transactions are highly asset specific. Infrastructure investments of a farmer in the 
irrigation infrastructure cannot be recovered if other farmers fail to invest too and/or if the 
farmer moves elsewhere. Similarly, there are cropping investments every year that will not 
be recovered if there are water use or water allocation issues. Irrigation associations secure 
all those investments by integrating farmers within a cooperative regime of water and 
infrastructure management rules; however, some disturbances can challenge the 
performance of those rules. The reduction of water availability during a drought, for 
example, can increase opportunistic behavior among farmers and decrease compliance with 
water management rules (Osés-Eraso et al. 2008). Similarly, urbanization can decrease the 
willingness of farmers to keep investing in the shared infrastructure (Cox 2014). The non-
recoverability loses if water use, water allocation or infrastructure maintenance transactions 
fail may constitute a sufficient motivation for farmers to engage cooperative responses that 
secure those transactions. 
Environmental uncertainty refers to the occurrence of “random acts of nature” that 
affect transactions (Williamson, 1985, p. 57). As posed by Williamson, the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by partners in a transaction increases with environmental 
uncertainty. In highly uncertain situations, partners may prefer cooperating within an 
overarching organization rather than just engaging in ad hoc contracting (Williamson 
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1991). Nature-related transactions, like those featured in irrigation systems, are particularly 
vulnerable to uncertainty due to their exposure to environmental disturbances (Thiel et al. 
2016). One way to assess the uncertainty generated by a disturbance is by looking at its 
intensity. Disturbance intensity can be defined as the deviation from a norm given a time 
frame (Schoon and Cox 2011). Changes that occur progressively over time (e.g., 
demographic transitions) may represent significant deviations from the norm in the long 
term; however, deviations are small in the short term and therefore relatively predictable 
over time. Alternatively, intense or sudden changes (e.g., a flood) are difficult to predict 
and generate information gaps. In irrigation systems, gaps would include the lack of 
information about the impact of the disturbance on the infrastructure, resource availability, 
or the behavior of farmers, for example. The risk that rent seekers use those information 
gaps opportunistically, would motivate a majority of farmers to engage in cooperation and 
respond collectively to the disturbance.  
The frequency of transactions also motivates the establishment of cooperative 
arrangements. Everything else being equal, the frequency of a transaction contributes to the 
profitability of scale economies if partners decide to cooperate and integrate the transaction 
in a common organization (Williamson 1991). This logit can be extrapolated to the study of 
disturbances in the irrigation context: disturbances that occur frequently facilitate that 
farmers standardize their responses under a common cooperative strategy (Janssen et al. 
2007). However, there is a caveat to bear in mind. Frequency is an attribute of intense 
disturbances (Schoon and Cox 2011). As such, one could argue that that frequency 
diminishes the uncertainty generated by intense disturbances (Janssen et al. 2007). In that 
case, the risk of opportunistic behavior and the motivation for cooperation among farmers 
would also be expected to decrease. 
Finally, there is the relational distance between transacting partners. Relational distance 
depends on social and physical distance. Social distance indicates the existence of 
heterogeneous interests and experiences among transacting partners. Everything else being 
equal, interest heterogeneity increases the risk of opportunistic behavior and thus the 
motivation for cooperation among transacting partners (Thiel et al. 2016). Physical distance 
is rather related to the location where the costs or benefits of transactions originate. As 
physical distance increases, so shall the barriers to proper information flows, the room for 
opportunistic behavior, and the motivation for cooperation (Thiel et al. 2016). In the 
irrigation context, disturbances caused by agents other than the irrigators (e.g., 
urbanization) require the accommodation of more heterogeneous interests, than 
disturbances caused by the irrigators themselves (e.g., rule compliance issues). Similarly, 
disturbances that originate outside an irrigation system (e.g., droughts) affect partners that 
are physically more distant than the partners affected when disturbances originate inside the 
system (i.e., the breakage of a canal).  
In synthesis, disturbances can be featured by looking at the uncertainty of their 
occurrence and their frequency, as well at the asset specificity and distance of the 
transactions and agents they affect. Uncertainty and distance would increase the risk of 
opportunistic behavior and in turn the motivation for cooperation; frequency would 
motivate cooperation mostly by facilitating the development economies of scale; and asset 
specificity would do ti by increasing the loses in case of failing to cope with the disturbance 
satisfactorily. Different combinations of these features would motivate cooperative 
responses in different degree. 
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2.2 The costs of collective action: cooperation vs. coordination responses 
 
Irrigation associations act as cooperatives to carry some tasks but also allow farmers to 
coordinate ad hoc with each other or with other agents and organizations to accomplish 
other tasks. Whether the associations opt for one or the other modes of collective action 
shall be explained by the transaction costs of each option (Menard 2007).  A similar logic 
can be used to reason about responses to disturbances. As pointed by Araral (2013b), 
adaptation transaction costs (ATC) “lie at the heart of the analytics of climate adaptation in 
the local commons, and minimizing ATC holds the key to climate adaptation” (pp. 150) . 
The costs of collective action depend on the number of collective tasks to carry. A well 
established distinction of collective tasks includes communication, decision-making, and 
enforcement task (Ostrom et al. 1994). The tasks can be cumulative resulting in first, 
second and further-order collective action processes (Fowler 2005, Panchanathan and Boyd 
2004). Coordination is one of the simplest forms of collective action (Bowles 2009). For 
just coordination to happen communication and/or collective choice among individuals may 
be sufficient. In game theoretic terms, coordination is associated to the resolution of 
assurance problems, which are defined by the existence of win-win situations where there 
are no incentives for some individuals to free ride on the cooperative behavior of others. 
Everything being equal, once agents coordinate, they shall do it indefinitely. As pointed by 
Bowles (Bowles 2009), in coordination situations, “the challenge to governance is limited 
to the less challenging how to get there problem rather than also having to solve the more 
demanding how to stay there problem” (p 44).  
Cooperation goes beyond coordination. Cooperation situations are characterized by the 
commitment of participants to the maintenance of common pool resources and/or the 
provision of public goods, such as infrastructure and  institutions (Ostrom et al. 1994). 
Commitment in cooperation situations require enforcement because there is a permanent 
risk that free riders jeopardize the efforts of those who cooperate (Fehr 2004). Thus, there is 
the need of interventions that change the structure of payoffs and guarantee individuals not 
only get there but also stay there. From an institutional perspective, that not only involves 
communication and collective decision making, but requires enforcement mechanisms 
(Fowler 2005, Panchanathan and Boyd 2004).  
 
3. Background  
 
The study was carried in the North-east of Spain. The area under study  expands across 
the inter basin of the Gállego and Cinca rivers, which are born in the Pyrenees Mountains 
and flow into the Ebro River by the city of Zaragoza (region of Aragon). 
The basics of the organization of irrigation management in Spain are prescribed by law. 
At the irrigation system level, water is managed by water user associations (WUAs). For 
that purpose, WUAs are to be organized into an assembly of users, an executive board, a 
secretary/field guard, and a president. At the basin level, water is managed a river basin 
organization (RBOs), e.g., the Ebro River Water Agency (CHE). RBOs are responsible for 
allocating water among the WUAs and the promotion of new infrastructures at the basin 
level. Also, there are the local governments of the municipalities where the irrigation 
systems are located, which have authority over drinking water and land use.  
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4. Methods 
 
The unit of analysis in this study are disturbances-response cases observed in 5 
irrigation systems within the area of study. One disturbance may hit different irrigation 
systems. Also, one irrigation association may develop multiple independent responses to 
cope with a disturbance. Thus, the number of disturbance response cases in this study 
results from the number of disturbances identified, the number of irrigation systems hit by 
each of those disturbances, and the number of responses developed in each system to cope 
with each disturbance. 
The selection of the systems was purposive and aimed to maximize the diversity of 
disturbances studied, including those linked to climate  as well as others. The study of 
disturbances and responses of different nature over time requires the use of multiple data 
sources (Araral 2013c). In this study,  data was obtained from a thorough review of 
assembly meeting minutes of the last 20 years in each of the 5 WUAs that manage the 
selected irrigation systems. The data obtained was used to elaborate a list of disturbances 
and responses for each system. If one WUA had developed multiple responses to a 
disturbance, the responses were coded separately if they had been designed and/or 
implemented independently from each other. For example, the construction of an in-system 
water reservoir and the development of rules to manage it were coded as one response to 
droughts, while the development of a drought quota policy was coded as a separate 
response. Then, the relevance of the disturbances and the independence of the responses 
were checked through a series of group and individual interviews with executive board 
members and farmers of the WUAs.  
 
Table 1. Measurement of disturbance features 
Disturbance feature  Description 
Asset specificity1 
 
1= The disturbance threatened either water use and water 
allocation transactions, water use and infrastructure maintenance 
transactions, water allocation and infrastructure maintenance 
transactions, or all of them; 0=otherwise 
Intensity  
(Uncertainty)2 
1= The disturbance, in all its magnitude, occurred from one 
irrigation campaign to the other; 0=otherwise 
Frequency  
 
1= The disturbance occurred more than once in the last 20 years; 
0=otherwise 
Exogeneity  
(Distance)3  
1= The disturbance was originated outside of the system and/or 
by actors not belonging to the irrigation system and association; 
0=otherwise 
Response feature  Description 
Communication 1= The response required sharing of information among farmers 
and with the WUA staff or executive board members; 
0=otherwise 
Collective choice 1= The response involved a collective decision among farmers in 
the WUA (i.e., in an assembly meeting); 0=otherwise 
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Rule/contributions 
enforcement4 
1= The response required the enforcement of rules/contributions 
to cope with the disturbance among the irrigation association 
members; 0=otherwise 
1: As reasoned in section 2.1, water use, water allocation and infrastructure maintenance are key, highly asset 
specific transactions in irrigation systems. 
2: There are different types of uncertainty and possible proxies for it (Santoro and McGill 2005). As reasoned 
in section 2.1, intensity is one plausible proxy as events that occur suddenly create more uncertainty than 
those that unfold progressively, everything else being equal (Janssen et al. 2007). Intensity was also relatively 
easy to measure in the empirical context of this study. 
3: As reasoned in section 2.1, exogenous disturbances (i.e., originated outside an irrigation system and/or by 
non-irrigators), can proxy for social and physical distance of transacting partners, respectively.  
4In irrigation systems responses may involve the implementation of ad hoc infrastructure investments, rules or 
both (Araral 2013a). The categories of “rule enforcement” and “contributions enforcement” aim to capture 
different combinations of those options. Enforcement entails both the existence of monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanisms (Coleman and Steed 2009).  
 
The analysis proceeded in several steps. First the information about each disturbance-
response case was coded into different disturbance and response variables based on the 
reviewed theory (Table 1; see also Appendix for further information and an example of 
coded case). It is important to note that disturbances that were not intense were not coded 
for frequency, as the latter is a feature that applies only to intense disturbances given a time 
frame (Schoon and Cox 2011). Thus the data collection resulted in two datasets, one 
including all the disturbance-response cases, and one including only the disturbance-
response cases associated to intense disturbances. As detailed below, the analysis was 
carried for each dataset separately. 
In a second step, the disturbance-response cases were further coded into a 
“cooperation” outcome variable. Based on the reviewed theory, the presence or absence of 
enforcement in the response was used as a proxy to distinguish cooperation from 
coordination responses (Bowles 2009). In irrigation systems and other local common pool 
resource contexts, enforcement is usually linked to the implementation of resource 
appropriation rules and/or ad hoc infrastructure contributions (Ostrom et al. 1994). Thus, 
the cooperation variable was assigned a 1 if “rule enforcement” and/or “contributions 
enforcement” were present, regardless of whether other collective tasks were also present.  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was used to explore associations 
combinations of disturbance characteristics and cooperation. In QCA, cases are understood 
as types in terms of the combinations of conditions that characterize them (Ragin 2000). 
The method does not assume independent effects of conditions on outcomes, which is 
particularly appropriate in the study of complex socio-ecological processes like those 
involving adaptation (Lam and Ostrom 2010). Also, QCA offers the possibility to compare 
small to medium size samples of cases, which was practical for this study due to the 
difficulties of gathering data about disturbances and responses. QCA has also limits. QCA 
requires explaining relationships in terms of necessity and sufficiency, which is not how 
mainstream theory is usually formulated (Ragin 2000).  Also, there is the trade-off between 
number of conditions included in the analysis and the meaning of results, as many 
conditions produce very complex results that can be hard to interpret theoretically 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2010). 
The analysis proceed in three steps following the QCA standard analysis (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2010): 
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- First, the analysis explored whether any of the disturbance features were necessary 
and/or sufficient for cooperation to emerge.  
- Second, the analysis explored whether combinations of asset specificity, intensity, 
exogeneity were sufficient for cooperation to emerge with the full dataset of 
disturbance-response cases. Also, the role of frequency was explored with the 
subset of cases of intense disturbances.  
- Third, the analysis was replicated to explain the absence of cooperation (i.e. the 
emergence of just coordination), with both the full dataset and the dataset of intense 
disturbances.  
Additionally, the robustness of the results was checked against an aggregated version 
of the dataset. 
 
5. Results: Patterns of disturbances and responses 
5.1 Disturbances 
 
Data collection resulted in the identification of 17 disturbances (see disturbance names 
in italics in Table 3). Some disturbances (“lack of labor factor”, “crop intensification”, 
“highway/railway development”, “landslides” and “droughts”) occurred in more than one 
system, making a total of 29 disturbance cases (ndc). 
Disturbances can be grouped depending on the configuration of features (specificity, 
intensity, frequency and exogeneity) that characterize them.  
The group of “Internal and progressive cooperation threats” (ndc=7) includes 
disturbance that are asset specific, emerged progressively (not intense, and not frequent), 
and originated from within the system (not exogenous). A paradigmatic example of this 
type of disturbance is the decrease of labor factor due to the aging and out-migration of 
population (not exogenous) over the last decades (CESA 2012). This trend unfolded slowly 
over the last decades (not intense) and is expected to continue at least in the next years 
(Pinilla Navarro and Saez Perez 2009). Many WUAs in Spain, including the 5 associations 
under study, rely on labor and monetary contributions from farmers to maintain part of the 
infrastructure, as well as on their active involvement in the water allocation to guarantee 
that water flows into the plots at the expected time. The progressive rural depopulation has 
threatened the effectiveness of those two operations in all 5 systems (high asset specificity).  
The other three groups include: “External and frequent disturbances” (ndc=6), “External 
and infrequent disturbances”  (ndc=5), and “External and progressive disturbances” (ndc=2). 
The disturbances in these groups have in common their low asset specificity, i.e., the 
disturbances threatened only one of the three main transactions carried in the irrigation 
systems. The momentary breakage of a main canal or the impact of landslides on the 
infrastructure affected the ability of farmers to allocate water in a timely manner during the 
irrigation campaign; however, the events did not threaten the ability of farmers to have 
access to the water they needed by the end of the irrigation campaign or to fulfill regular 
infrastructure maintenance duties (low asset specificity). Similarly, the flooding of a large 
number of plots nearby a lake created controversy about whether the affected farmers 
should keep fulfilling their regular infrastructure duties, but not about whether there would 
be sufficient water to satisfy needs or whether the water would be properly allocated.  
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5.2 Responses 
  
The irrigation associations developed an average of two responses per disturbance case, 
resulting in a pool of 50 disturbance-response cases (Appendix, Table 1). The exploration 
of collective action tasks resulted in the identification of 6 types of responses (Table 2). The 
most frequent type of responses is the “delegation on external entity” (ndisturb-resp cases=21), 
which involves communication and collective choice tasks. The most frequent collective 
tasks are communication (present in all instances) and collective choice (present in 36 
occasions). This was expected given that communication and collective decision making 
are two of the most basic forms of collective action (Ostrom et al. 1994). The Outcome 
splits the sample into 23 cooperation responses and 27 non-cooperation (i.e., just 
coordination) responses.  
As expected, there is a gradient of responses depending on the number of collective 
action tasks (and costs) involved (see Outcome 2). Cooperation responses, defined by their 
reliance on enforcement tasks, tend to involve more collective action tasks than 
coordination responses. An exception to this is the “Ad hoc use of preexisting institution” 
(cooperation response), which is, by the number of tasks involved, as demanding as 
“Bargaining with external entity and Delegation on external entity” (coordination 
responses). 
 
Table 2. Response types (ndisturbance-response cases=50) 
Response type ndrc Collective action tasks  
(and costs) 
Outcome  
Ad hoc internal mitigation 
(12%) 
6 communication  (+)  
No cooperation 
(just 
coordination)  
Bargaining external entity 
(14%) 
Delegation external entity 
(28%) 
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14 
communication; collective 
choice (++) 
Ad hoc use of preexisting 
institution (16%) 
8 communication, rule 
enforcement  (++) 
 
 
 
 
Cooperation  
Infrastructure development 
(6%) 
Institutional development 
(12%) 
3 
 
6 
communication; collective 
choice; rule/contribution 
enforcement  (+++) 
Infrastructure & 
institutional development 
(12%) 
6 communication; collective 
choice; rule and contribution 
enforcement  (++++) 
 
2.2.1 Non-cooperation responses 
 
Among the non-cooperation (i.e., just coordination) responses, the least demanding type 
from a collective action perspective is the “ad hoc internal mitigation” type. A paradigmatic 
example of this type is how two WUAs respond to infrastructure issues due to the 
occurrence of landslides. When a landslide breaks or blocks the infrastructure, whoever 
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first notices it informs the guard, who then carries the cleaning of the canal, sometimes with 
the help of day-laborers and heavy machinery. This is not perceived by farmers as a rule or 
a norm but just a “way of doing things”. The guards do not have enough monitoring 
resources to notice the event in time. Communication among the farmers and the guard is 
thus key for the success of the response. The measures taken by the guard are then reported 
to all farmers in an ordinary assembly meeting, but only ad hoc, for ratification.  
“Bargaining with external entities” and “delegation on external entities” are two types 
of responses that also entail relatively low collective action costs. In both types, 
communication happened mostly between farmers and the WUA executive board. The 
issues were also tackled in general assembly meetings to decide on the most appropriate 
course of action that the executive board should follow. The responses did not require the 
enforcement of any rules among the farmers. Regular assembly meetings were also used to 
control that the executive board had carried it properly. Common examples of the 
“delegation” type are the use of letters of complaint and the request of investments to the 
RBO and local governments in response to river flood damages and breakages in the main 
canal breakages that connect irrigation systems. An example of the “bargaining” type is the 
response developed by three WUAs to cope with highway and railway constructions. The 
constructions intersected the main and secondary canals of the systems. In all systems, the 
assembly of farmers explicitly authorized the executive board of the WUAs to represent 
their interests against the construction firms and the department of public works, and 
guarantee that the affected infrastructure was reconstructed properly.  
2.2.3 Cooperation responses 
 
Among the cooperation responses, the least demanding response from a collective 
action perspective is the “ad hoc use of preexisting institution”. An example is the response 
used in 4 of the systems to cope with maintenance problems due to the decreased labor 
factor. In all systems, the guard has the authority to carry the maintenance works if farmers 
fail to perform their duties. Then, the costs of the works and a penalty are charged to the 
farmers. This institution had been developed in the past as a deterrence measure; however, 
as infractions have become more and more frequent in all 4 systems, the institution has also 
grown in relevance as a maintenance measure. The measure involves communication and 
enforcement but not collective choice, as the rule already existed.  
Institutional and infrastructure development are the two types of response that entail the 
highest collective action costs. Both types of responses require the development of 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, in addition to communication and collective 
choice. An example of rule development is the quota policy that two WUAs developed in 
response to droughts. Under the quota policy every farm is allotted a rate of water per 
hectare. If farmers go over their quotas they are sanctioned. The policy was approved in 
each association by the ensemble of farmers, and is ratified also every time the executive 
board needs to use it. An example of infrastructure development is, for example, the 
remodeling of a river diversion infrastructure in the aftermath of a river flood in one of the 
WUAs. The remodeling was approved in the assembly, and a special fee was collected 
among all farmers to finance it. 
In a good number of cases, responses involved both infrastructure investments and the 
development of rules to manage the new infrastructure. A good example is the investments 
in sprinkler irrigation carried by two WUAs to better cope with the lack of labor, and the 
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changes that followed those investments to adapt the water allocation rules to the new 
technology. 
2.2.4 Combinations of responses 
  
A fair number of disturbance cases were addressed through both cooperation and 
coordination responses. WUAs relied only on coordination responses in 13 disturbance 
cases; only on  cooperation responses in 8 disturbance cases; and both on coordination and 
cooperation responses in 9 disturbance cases. In 7 out of the 9 disturbance cases where 
cooperation and coordination responses coexisted, the coordination response consisted on 
the delegation or bargaining with external entities. 
 
5.3 Analysis of disturbances and responses 
 
The analysis of necessity yielded relatively clear results. “Asset specificity” and 
“frequency” have the highest consistency value (around 70% the disturbance response 
cases where disturbance was asset specific or frequent the response was cooperative)1; 
however this value is far from reaching 0.9, which has been used as a threshold of necessity 
in previous studies (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). All the other consistence scores were 
below 0.6. Coverage scores (percentage of cases that share a disturbance feature within the 
group of cooperation responses ) also indicate that none of the features are sufficient by 
their own to trigger cooperative responses. None of the features reach the coverage 
threshold of 0.7 (Schneider and Wagemann 2010), although “asset specificity” and (lack of) 
“exogeneity” are close (0.680 and 0.667, respectively).  
 
Table 3. Configurations of disturbance characteristics that are sufficient for cooperation 
(complex solution) 
 ndrc Disturbances 
Full sample (Cooperationasset specific, intense, exogenous) 
1. intense*exogenous  
Consistency: 0.722 
Coverage: 0.542 
18 Crop intensification, lack of 
labor, debtors  
2. ASSET SPECIFIC*INTENSE*EXOGENOUS 
Consistency: 0.714 
Coverage: 0.208 
6 Droughts, drainage-storm 
 
Intense disturbances sample (Cooperationasset specific, frequent, exogenous) 
3. ASSET SPECIFIC*FREQUENT*EXOGENOUS 
Consistency: 1.0 
Coverage: 0.5  
5 Droughts  
Note: Upper case letters=presence of condition; Lower case letter=absence of condition. The sufficiency cut 
for the full sample analysis was downgraded to 0.65 as this cut represented a natural break in the data 
                                                          
1 This result is further confirmed by a Pearson’s chi-square test comparing the frequency of cooperation 
responses across asset and non-asset specific disturbances (Chi2= 8.012, p-value = 0.005).  
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(Schneider and Wagemann 2010). In the rest of sufficiency analyses 0.7 matched the natural breaks in the 
data. 
 
The analysis of sufficiency first required synthesizing the data into two truth tables, one 
for the full sample of disturbances and one for the sub-sample of intense disturbances (see 
Appendix, Tables 2 and 3). The truth table includes all configurations of disturbance 
features that are represented by actual cases (i.e., disturbance-response cases) and 
information about the extent to which the cases are associated to the outcome (i.e., 
cooperation responses). Then the truth table was minimized via Boolean algebra into a 
complex solution. The complex solution, is the minimal expression of all configurations that 
are empirically associated to the outcome. Contrary to the parsimonious solution, the 
complex solution does not require making ad hoc assumptions about configurations for 
which no empirical cases have been observed (Ragin and Sonnett 2004). As pointed by 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2010), both need to be reported (see Appendix, Table 4, for the 
parsimonious solutions).  
As shown in the full sample analysis (solutions 1 and 2 in Table 3), two configurations 
of disturbance features are sufficient for cooperation.  The first of represents cooperation 
threats that emerge progressively from within the system such as crop intensification; the 
second refers to sudden external threats such as droughts. The analysis of the intense 
disturbances sample yields one solution (solution 3). This solution represents frequent and 
exogenous cooperation threats, and further qualifies the findings from solution 2. 
According to the solution, intense and frequent threats such as droughts are sufficient to 
motivate cooperation, but intense and infrequent threats (such as a leadership crisis) are not.  
According to the analysis of necessity for the absence of cooperation (i.e., occurrence of 
just coordination) no individual condition is necessary. All scores are below 0.7. The 
highest score  holds for the presence of exogeneity (0.731) but still far from the 0.9 
threshold. A look at the coverage scores, reveals that the absence of “asset specificity”, 
with a score of 0.720, is the only sufficient condition for the lack of cooperation. This 
means that whatever combinations of disturbance characteristics involving the absence of 
asset specificity is sufficient for the absence of cooperation too. That said, the sufficiency 
analysis revealed two other sufficiency paths, one per sample (see Table 5 in Appendix).  
The first path refers to progressive and external events such as urban pollution. The 
configuration confirms that progressive disturbances also need to be internal to trigger 
cooperation, regardless of asset specificity. The second path  represents external and 
infrequent events such as highway/rail way development and confirms that external 
disturbances are less amenable to cooperation, again regardless of asset specificity.  
A cross-tabulation revealed an strong association between the exogeneity of 
disturbances and the “delegation on external entities” and “bargaining with external 
entities” coordination responses. Half of the “delegation on external entities” responses (5 
out of 11) addressed exogenous and frequent disturbances; while most of the “bargaining 
with external entities” responses (5 out of 7) addressed exogenous and infrequent 
disturbances.  
The robustness check with the aggregated data yielded very similar results (see 
Appendix, Table 6). 
 
6. Discussion 
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The characterization of disturbances and responses and the QCA results motivate some 
discussion points. First, the relatively broad scope of disturbances identified raises the 
question of whether the current focus on climate change of the adaptation policy 
community  is justified scientifically. Climate-related disturbances such as droughts, floods, 
or algae burst events represented less than 24% of all disturbance-cases analyzed in this 
study. Other important disturbances included the lack of labor factor, crop intensification or 
urbanization issues, to mention a few. The diversity of disturbances identified justifies the 
interest of understanding climate change adaptation in comparative perspective. One 
important step in that direction is the development of theoretically and empirically 
meaningful classifications of disturbances and responses (Salafsky et al. 2008). In this 
study, the characterization of disturbances according to asset specificity, uncertainty, 
frequency and distance, allowed the identification of 4 groups disturbances, encompassing 
20 of the 29 disturbance cases identified. Similarly, the classification of collective 
responses according to collective action tasks and costs yielded a scale that can be used for 
further analytical purposes. Works in the common pool resource tradition have highlighted 
the exposure of local resource management systems to external interventions and events 
(Cox et al. 2010) and the need to expand theory to understand  how those systems cope 
with such events (Armitage 2005). Resilience scholars have theorized about the importance 
of slow vs fast moving changes (Janssen et al. 2007) and other disturbance features 
(Schoon 2008). Scholars have also identified different types of adaptations based on the 
observation of local experiences (Agrawal 2010, Smit and Skinner 2002). The 
classifications resulting from this study make a step further in integrating the study of 
disturbances and responses under a common theoretical framework that is also relevant 
empirically. 
Second, the analysis of coordination responses reveals insights about the division of 
labor between governance levels in adaptation processes. Most of the coordination 
responses developed by WUAs consisted on the delegation on or bargaining with external 
entities. The contribution of multi-level management to adaptive capacity is well 
understood among scholars and practitioners (Olsson et al. 2004). Less is known about how 
labor should be divided between governance levels (Frey et al. 2016). The subsidiarity 
principle in the context of environmental governance states that management decisions 
should occur at the lowest level at which they can be performed competently (Marshall 
2008). Resilience scholars have used this principle to argue for a fit between the scale at 
which disturbances occur and the governance level at which they should be addressed 
(Levin et al. 1998). In this study, WUAs tended  to recur to external entities in the advent of 
external disturbances; delegation responses tended to address frequent disturbances, while 
bargaining responses followed infrequent ones. All this supports the fit hypothesis and 
encourages looking at both the origin and frequency of disturbances when studying the 
division of labor between governance levels. Finally, the reliance of WUAs on external 
entities did not preclude that WUAs develop their own responses, which brings the 
question of the appropriate degree of complementarity and redundancy across governance 
levels (Low et al. 2003). This study was not designed to address that question; however, the 
assessment of disturbances and responses in terms of risk of opportunism and collective 
action costs, respectively, shall be useful for that purpose. 
Another insight is related to the only relative importance of new rule development (i.e., 
as opposed to the adaptation of existing rules and non-institutional responses) to address 
disturbances. Institutional design, i.e., the implementation of new policies, is one of the 
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cornerstones climate change adaptation (see Roggero et al., in this issue for an overview of 
the climate adaptation literature). In this study, however, new rule development occurred in 
only 24% of the occasions. Also, the “ad hoc use of preexisting institution” occurred in 
16% of the cases, which illustrates that given institutions can be reinterpreted to uncover 
situations for which those institutions had not been originally designed. This type of 
institutional change, which has been coined by path dependency scholars in different ways 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005) has barely been explored by adaptation scholars. As framed in 
this study, the “ad hoc use of preexisting institution” is a relatively low cost adaptation 
strategy; however, its association mostly to the occurrence of internal and progressive 
threats suggests that such strategy may not be suitable in all occasions.  
Last but not least, the QCA results illustrate opportunities and limits of using 
transaction costs economics to understand adaptation. According to the analysis, 
disturbances that are asset specific, intense but frequent, and exogenous (e.g., droughts in 
this study) are sufficient to trigger cooperative responses. This supports expectations based 
on transaction costs theory. According to Williamson (Williamson 1985), cooperative 
governance arrangements are more likely to emerge given asset specific and uncertain 
transactions, or given asset specific and frequent transactions. In the first case, the high 
costs and high probability of contract failure would make risk sufficiently high to make 
cooperation worth it, even if cooperation costs are high. In the second case, frequency 
would reduce the costs of cooperation, which would pave the way for cooperation, given 
high costs of contract failure (and regardless of the probability of such failure). According 
to the QCA findings, both uncertainty (i.e., created by intense disturbances) as well as the 
profitability of economies of scale (i.e., stemming from frequent disturbances) would be 
sufficient to trigger cooperation, given that asset specific assets are at risk. Additionally, the 
findings point to an alternative path, which is the occurrence of progressive and internal 
disturbances, regardless of their asset specificity (i.e., crop intensification, lack of labor 
factor, debtors). This path is rather congruent with relational theory, which aims to explain 
cooperation by looking at the formation of trust relationships rather than the minimization 
of opportunistic behavior (Lui et al. 2009). In contrast to transaction costs theory, relational 
theory builds on the assumption that economic agents are willing to commit to long term 
cooperative relationships with each other if necessary (Joshi and Stump 1999). Behavior in 
trust-based relationships is controlled not through incentives but through internalization. 
Thus, time and the credibility of partners are essential. According to this, disturbances that 
unfold progressively would allow for sufficient time to develop cooperative solutions 
incrementally if necessary, and provide a long enough time horizon that make those 
solutions cost-appealing in the short term. Additionally, if the disturbances originate within 
a community, members could more easily build on their physical proximity, internal norms 
and trust relationships than if the disturbances are originated by outsiders. Given these 
conditions, even a minimum of asset specificity would make cooperation worth it.  
 
7. Conclusions  
 
Other than the specific findings reported and discussed in the previous sections, this 
study triggers some final reflections. First, it is still unclear in the adaptation scholarship 
whether climate change adaptation challenges are fundamentally different from other types 
of events that hit our societies at different scales. This study has illustrated that societies 
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(e.g., natural resource management communities and associations) opt for different 
collective adaptation responses depending on the risks of opportunism and collective action 
costs involved, and regardless of whether the disturbances are climate-related or not.  
Second, an important step to compare adaptation to different disturbances and develop 
solid adaptation theory is the use of meaningful classifications of events and responses. 
Previous studies have pointed to different ways to characterize disturbances (Salafsky et al. 
2008, Schoon and Cox 2011), but there is no theory about how these disturbance features 
combine in real scenarios and align with responses. As illustrated in this study, the Coase-
Ostrom-Williamson (COW) framework reveal as powerful means to construct such 
classifications.  
Third, transaction costs theory is relevant but should not be used as the only theoretical 
pillar to understand disturbances and adaptation responses. Relational theory, which looks 
at social capital dynamics, can be also useful. Although transaction costs and relational 
theory can be interpreted as antagonistic, scholars have proposed models that integrate both 
(Joshi and Stump 1999). Adaptation studies shall benefit from those efforts. As illustrated 
in this study, the observation of disturbance characteristics can help to understand when one 
theory is more applicable than the other.  
As a final reflection, this study illustrates the capacity of local organizations to respond 
to a variety of disturbances, including climate-related ones as well as many others. 
Irrigation associations  and other local natural resource management organizations in many 
countries are depositaries of extensive adaptation experience and knowledge, which stems 
from their long exposure to a variety of threats to their organizational performance and 
sustainability over time. Being able to capitalize on that knowledge is a priority for the 
policy community (UN/ISDR 2004).     
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Appendix 
Illustration of variable measurement and coded case 
 
The case response cases were created based on three sources of data: meeting minutes from the executive 
committee and general assemblies (1970-2010); a focus group interview with members of the executive 
committee of each irrigation association; and individual interviews with members of the executive committee 
and farmers. Focus groups and group interviews in general are recommendable when the topic of interest is 
habit or not thought in detail by participants; however, individual interviews may still be necessary for 
triangulation purposes (Morgan 1997). Scanning the meeting minutes was not allowed so relevant pieces of 
text were recorded and then transcribed. Individual interviewees were selected according following a snow-
ball procedure. All the group and individual interviews were recorded. The recordings were used to enhance 
the notes taken during the interviews. The formal characterization of cases was carried by person. The use of 
multiple coders adds reliability to measurement, which is appropriate if data is collected only from one source 
and there are potential issues of interpretation. In this study, all facts from the minutes were checked via the 
focus groups. Remaining gaps were filled through the individual interviews.  
 
Case 42 (Internal progressive cooperation threat & Use of existing rule response) 
Summary:  
- Disturbance: In old irrigation systems like the FVT, there are many small, secondary and tertiary 
ditches that bring water to the plots or collect drained water. Over time, compliance with the 
maintenance duties of these ditches has decreased. This is an labor-intense work that can be done 
with machines only to some extent. Agriculture is not a full time for an increasing number of farmers 
and there is less labor available to carry the maintenance duties. If the ditches are not cleaned 
water does not flow properly and this generates water allocation problems.   
- Response 1: When a farmer does not comply with his maintenance duties and this is detected by the 
guard, the association has the authority to carry the duties and then charge the farmer 
accordingly. As the problem of lack of compliance scaled up, the association started acting only if 
any farmers complained.  
 
Disturbance characteristics   
Water use specific + Meeting minutes: 
“Given the continuous complains related to the bad conditions of the 
drainage ditches of this association, it has been agreed by unanimity to find 
a solution…” (September 1973) 
“...it is debated the continuous increase of living costs and the need to 
update the payments to the labor that is hired to assist the cleaning of the 
infrastructure…” (September 1976) 
“The President expresses his concern about the continuous maintenance 
issues associated to the increasing difficulties for farmers to carry their 
duties manually…” (April 1989) 
“Sr. F.P. complains about the maintenance issues in the Masarrabal ditch. 
There is a section of that ditch were farmers do not carry their maintenance 
duties and this causes continuous water spills with important damages to 
the neighbors…” (July 1997)  
Executive committee focus group: 
“drainage ditches are shared in common by groups of farmers…farmers 
were more and more disinterested in cleaning them… they would not do it 
themselves and would not hire labor to do it…” 
“…if the drainage ditches are not clean, water does not flow and it floods 
the fields…” 
“…it was all part of a social change… before, a plot was managed by a 
family but now farmers need to cultivate more land and there is not enough 
labor…cleaning is not a nice work… before there were many people who 
would do it for money, but this has changed…the issue has also to do with 
Water use specific  
Infrastructure specific + 
Intensity  
Exogeneity  
Frequency  
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the migration of people from the village to Barcelona; the land is 
abandoned and the maintenance duties too” (2011-12-23_FVT_JRC) 
Interviews: 
“…before everyone would carry the maintenance duties; it was a matter of 
reputation and respect. Now that is not anymore the case. Fewer people 
work full time in this system… now people use machines but machines 
cannot reach every corner of the system” (2011-12-05_FVT_JN)  
“…the problem emerged progressively since the 1970s…currently, given 
how spread out the problem is, the executive committee only acts if a 
farmer files a complain” (2011-12-05_FVT_O) 
Response characteristics   
Communication + Meeting minutes:  
“… the association lawyer is consulted about the issue of water filtrations 
and springs that are emerging all around the system due to the problem of 
lack of maintenance of drainage systems…after a long debate about it Sr. 
S. informs that he will study how to proceed” (June 1986) 
“Given the bad conditions of the ditch between Calle Alabon and Cami 
Petit… attendants to the meeting agree to formally request the cleaning of 
the ditch to the responsible farmers warning them that in 30 days the 
association will carry the cleaning if they do not do it, and then will charge 
the farmers accordingly” (January 1996) 
“Given the complaint against Dr. C.P… attendants agree by unanimity to 
formally request Dr. C.P. to carry the maintenance duties in the next 15 
days, or else the association will do it and pass the costs plus an extra 
charge to the farmer” (September 1995) 
Executive committee focus group: 
“…initially, the neighbors would clean the ditches of the absent neighbors 
and then charged the neighbors accordingly but as the problem scaled up 
that solution proved ineffective… at some point, the association started 
doing the job if any farmer would complain and would charge the neighbor 
afterwards…the association had a squad of laborers already  
(2011-12-23_FVT_JRC) 
Interviews: 
“…before the maintenance was carried by the farmers. The guard would 
monitor it and would carry the cleaning if farmers had not done it… bit a 
bit people stopped doing it and the problem scaled up…currently the 
executive committee only acts if someone complains” (2011-12-
05_FVT_AG) 
“…more and more farmers started piping their sections of the ditches…so 
the executive committee decided to set some standards. Farmers would 
need to notify the executive committee, the guard would pay a visit to the 
site and then the committee would give technical advice and make a 
resolution of approving or not the works” (2011-11-05_FVT_O) 
Collective choice + 
Rule enforcement  
Contribution enforcement  
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Table 1: Database of Disturbance-response cases 
ID WUA Disturbance Response Type 
 
Outcome  
Asset 
Specif. Intens. Frequ. Exogen. Comm. 
Coll. 
choice 
Rule 
enforc. 
Contrib. 
Enforc. 
1 SXI Drought Investment & rule 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 SXI Drought Rule development 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
3 SXI Crop intensification Investment & rule 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
4 SXI Crop intensification Investment & rule 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
5 SXI Crop intensification Delegation on external entity 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
6 SXI Crop intensification Delegation on external entity 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
7 SXI Lack of labor factor Investment & rule 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
8 SXI Energy price crisis Rule development 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
9 SXI Energy price crisis Bargaining with external entities 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
10 SXI Debtors Use of existing rule 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
11 SXI Debtors Use of existing rule 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
12 JC Drought Rule development 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
13 JC Crop intensification Rule development 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
14 JC Crop intensification Delegation on external entity 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
15 JC Crop intensification Investment & rule 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
16 JC Highway/railway isues Bargaining with external entities 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
17 JC New water users Bargaining with external entities 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
18 JC New water users Rule development 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
19 JC Lack of labor factor Use of existing rule 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
20 JC Canal breakages Delegation on external entity 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
21 JC Canal breakages Delegation on external entity 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
22 CV Drought Rule development 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
23 CV Lack of labor factor Use of existing rule 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
24 CV Lack of labor factor Investment 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
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25 CV Highway/railway issues Bargaining with external entities 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
26 CV Urbanization events Bargaining with external entities 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
27 CV Urbanization events Use of existing rule 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
28 CV Landslides Ad-hoc mitigation  0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
29 CV Landslides Delegation on external entity 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
30 CV Bad drainage-storm Delegation on external entity 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
31 CV River flood Investment 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
32 CV Highway/railway issues Delegation on external entity 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
33 SA Drought Delegation on external entity 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
34 SA Lack of labor factor Ad-hoc mitigation  0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
35 SA Lack of labor factor Use of existing rule 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
36 SA Urban pollution Delegation on external entity 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
37 SA Urban pollution Delegation on external entity 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
38 SA Lake flood Bargaining with external entities 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
39 SA Lake flood Investment 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
40 SA Landslides Ad-hoc mitigation  0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
41 SA Landslides Delegation on external entity 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
42 FVT Lack of labor factor Ad-hoc mitigation  0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
43 FVT Lack of labor factor Use of existing rule 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
44 FVT Lack of labor factor Investment & rule 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
45 FVT Leadership crisis Delegation on external entity 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
46 FVT Leadership crisis Use of existing rule 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
47 FVT River flood Ad-hoc mitigation  0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
48 FVT River flood Delegation on external entity 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
49 FVT Algae Ad-hoc mitigation  0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
50 FVT Highway/railway issues Bargaining with external entities 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
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Table 2: Truth table for full dataset 
Configuration 
#  
Asset 
specificity 
Intensity Exogeneity ndrc Configuration 
consistency 
1 0 0 0 2 1 
2 1 1 1 6 0.833 
3 1 0 0 16 0.688 
4 1 1 0 2 0.5 
5 0 0 1 4 0.250 
6 0 1 1 18 0.222 
7 0 1 0 1 0 
8 1 0 1 1 0 
 
Table 3: Truth table for intense disturbances dataset 
Configuration 
#  
Asset 
specificity 
Frequency Exogeneity ndrc Configuration 
consistency 
1 1 1 1 5 1 
2 1 0 0 2 0.5 
3 0 0 1 7 0.286 
4 0 1 1 11 0.182 
5 0 1 0 1 0 
6 1 0 1 1 0 
 
Table 4: Configurations of disturbance characteristic that are sufficient for cooperation 
(parsimonious solution) 
Full sample 
Presence of cooperation Absence of cooperation 
ASSET SPECIFIC*FREQUENT*EXOGENOUS 
Consistency: 0.883; Coverage: 0.208  
 
asset specific*INTENSE 
Consistency: 0.789; Coverage: 0.577 
Asset specific*intense*exogenous 
Consistency: 1.0.; Coverage: 0.083 
intense*EXOGENOUS 
Consistency: 0.8; Coverage: 0.154 
 
Intense disturbances sample 
Presence of cooperation Absence of cooperation 
ASSET SPECIFIC*FREQUENT 
Consistency: 1.0; Coverage: 0.5 
asset specific 
Consistency: 0.789; Coverage: 0.882 
 
frequent*EXOGENOUS 
Consistency: 0.75; Coverage: 0.353 
Note: Upper case letters=presence of condition; Lower case letter=absence of condition 
 
 
Table 5. Configurations of disturbance characteristics that are sufficient for the absence of 
cooperation, in addition to any configuration of not asset specific disturbances  
 ndrc Disturbances 
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Full sample   
1. intense*EXOGENOUS  
Consistency: 0.8 
Coverage: 0.154 
5 Bad road maintenance, urban pollution, lake flood 
 
 
Intense disturbances sample 
  
2. frequent* EXOGENOUS 
Consistency: 0.75 
Coverage: 0.353 
8 Urbanization issues, highway/railway development, 
energy crisis, bad road maintenance 
Note: Upper case letters=presence of condition; Lower case letter=absence of condition.  
The analysis of sufficiency yielded two other solutions (one per sample), that observed the absence of asset 
specificity. These solutions are not shown in the table for clarity purposes, given the findings from the 
necessity analysis.  
 
Table 6: Configurations of disturbance features that are sufficient for cooperation 
(aggregated data; complex solution) 
Full sample 
Presence of cooperation Absence of cooperation 
ASSET SPECIFIC*INTENSE*EXOGENOUS 
Consistency: 0.8; Coverage: 0.289  
 
Intense*exogenous 
Consistency: 0.792; Coverage: 0.458  
asset specific*INTENSE 
Consistency: 0.792 ; Coverage: 0.626 
 
intense*EXOGENOUS  
Consistency: 0.833; Coverage: 0.156  
 
Intense disturbances sample 
Presence of cooperation Absence of cooperation 
ASSET SPECIFIC*FREQUENT*EXOGENOUS 
Consistency: 1.0; Coverage: 0.533  
asset specific*FREQUENT 
Consistency: 0.786 ; Coverage: 0.478 
 
frequent*EXOGENOUS 
Consistency: 0.786 ; Coverage: 0.478 
Note: Data was aggregated by the mean to better capture potential interactions between responses of one 
association to the same disturbance. Data was also aggregated according to a maximum rule (a 1 was assigned 
if at least one cooperation response was present). The results were very similar (available upon request); 
Upper case letters=presence of condition; Lower case letter=absence of condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
